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Case No. 990085-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order revoking probation. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court commit error in revoking defendant's probation where 
defendant failed to complete one of the terms of probation because of his 
misbehavior while in jail? 
A trial court's revocation decision will be reversed "only if the evidence is so 
deficient as to render the court's action an abuse of discretion." State v. Maestas, 2000 
UT App 22, f 12, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statutory provision is attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 27, 1998, defendant was charged by information with one count each 
of aggravated robbery, receiving a stolen vehicle, and providing false information to a 
police officer (R. 1-2). On March 12, 1998, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of 
receiving a stolen vehicle; the two other counts were dismissed (R. 20-25, 65). Defendant 
received a suspended sentence of one to fifteen years (R. 35-37, 39-43). He was then 
ordered to serve six months in jail and to complete thirty-six months of probation (R. 35-
37,39-43). 
At a review hearing held January 6,1999, defendant admitted to a probation 
violation (R. 50-51). As a result, the trial court revoked defendant's probation and lifted 
the stay on his original sentence (R. 52-54). Defendant timely appealed (R. 56). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 26,1998, defendant drove a juvenile to an Albertson's parking lot in 
Washington County, where the juvenile shoplifted several items (R. 65:5, 8). When store 
personnel attempted to apprehend the juvenile, the juvenile ran to defendant's car, jumped 
in the door, and told defendant to "Go, go, go" (R. 65:8). Defendant then stepped on the 
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gas, running over the foot of one of the store employees, before the employees were able 
to pull the car keys out of the ignition (R. 65:8) Hie car was a stolen vehicle with 
Defendant was subsequently charged with aggravated robbery, receiving a stolen 
vehicle, and providing false information to a police officer (R. 1 2) Pursuant to i PKM 
agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession ofa stolen vehicle and tlte 
iiiirituitiing iJiaigt/s isrir ilisnussed (R "Ml 1,:i in) 
Prior to sentencing, a pre-sentence investigation report and a seventy-day 
diagnostic evaluation were completed (R. 27-30; 65:3). The pre-sentence investigation 
report indicated that defendant had "a couple" of pr 
liHf \ I'liirh i let'emliinl I MI I spent approximately four months incarcerated (R. 65:9, I 
Hie diagnostic evaluation disclosed that defendant had broken several of the 
prison's rules while undergoing evaluation and awaiting sentencing (R. 66:12-13; Eval. at 
2 3) I he evaluation .ilso mduiilnl MMI 'ilHnidnil litis lllliii i ii|i«iliili1% tin him tin in iiii 
treatment, with added assistance, if he chooses to do so" (Eval. at 2). At defendant's 
original sentencing hearing, defendant did not challenge any of the information in the 
diagnostic evaluation (R, 66). In fact, defense counsel acknowledged: "I understand he 
iinessol IIII nhilr hv \k,v\ I hen1 Hi1 rrl.mih hunhl mil have breached an) of the rules 
down there" (R. 66:12-13). 
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The trial court ordered that defendant serve one to fifteen years in Utah State 
Prison but stayed that sentence and placed defendant on thirty-six months' probation (R. 
66:16). The terms of the probation included serving six months in the Washington 
County Jail, during which time defendant was "to take each and every class available" (R. 
66:17). The court specifically told defendant "[i]t is essential that before you are released 
from Washington County Jail, you will take and complete the Life Skills course offered 
by that facility. I want you to take everything you can get your hands on, but that one 
definitely" (R. 66:19). Defendant was also ordered to undergo a medical evaluation and 
to take any medications prescribed to meet his psychological needs (R. 66:17). In 
conclusion, the trial court stated: "When you get back to jail, get to work. Use your time 
productively. Get on some medication, because if you do anything silly at this jail, I'll 
change my mind and [the review hearing in] December won't be a good time" (R. 66:21). 
At a review hearing held January 6, 1999, the State presented the trial court with a 
progress/violation report and a motion for an order to show cause from the probation 
department (R. 76:3). The progress/violation report stated that defendant "has 
disregarded the rules and regulations of the Jail" and, as a result, "has been placed in 
lockdown on at least seven occasions" (Report at 2). It further stated that defendant "had 
the opportunity and time to complete [the Life Skills] program and chose to continuously 
violate the jail rules which placed him into the position to be locked down" (Report at 2). 
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I he Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause identified defendant's failure to 
complete the Life skills program as the probation violation at issue (Aff. : lpport at 2). 
il llie I.iiiii.ii Mi l|l,IM linMiiiii III! In ill i mirl nsiiinl tin1 in qiiu'stnl nidn In JIDW 
cause and set the matter for hearing on January 13, 1999 (R. 76:3; Order to Show Cause 
it 1 2) Defendant, however, indicated that he wanted to settle the matter at the present 
hearing and admitted that he had violated the term of his probation i equii ing compi 
id llii" I if!" Skills i diss during In < iim an na t i on (R. 76:3-4) '* - defendant's counsel 
explained, defendant did not complete the class because he had been subjected to lock-
downs while in jail "because of some behaviors he had there" (R. 76:6). Defendant did 
no tcha iu .^t me information pro 'in li" I ill ilni11 pingress'V inlimnn icpnn i ibr slYulv in in 
Supr * to Show Cause (R. 76). 
Based on defendant's conduct, the trial court revoked defendant's probation and 
ordered that the stay on defendant's prison sentence be lifted (R. 76:6). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's challenge to the trial court's probation revocation order must fail. His 
claim that notice of the revocation hearing was deficient fails where the trial court offered 
iletenilaul ihlililinri.il liiiit In piqKtir iiiiil ilHcmlnnt inn I in1! that offer. His claim that the 
trial court should have required the State to present evidence of a probation violation fails 
because defendant himself admitted the violation. Finally, his claim that the trial court 
failed to consider whether defendant's \ iolation was willful lails because delcmlaiil in \ n 
5 
raised that issue below and because the record clearly supports the finding that 
defendant's conduct was willful. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REVOKING 
DEFENDANT'S PROBATION WHERE DEFENDANT 
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO A FUTURE HEARING ON 
THE MATTER AND ADMITTED, WITHOUT 
OBJECTION, TO VIOLATING THE TERMS OF HIS 
PROBATION 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in revoking his probation because he 
"was not given proper notice" of the motion for order to show cause why his probation 
should not be revoked. Aplt. Br. at 6. He further asserts that the trial court erred in 
failing to require the State to prove a probation violation by a preponderance of the 
evidence. See Aplt. Br. at 7. Finally, defendant claims that the trial court erred because it 
"failed to make findings of fact" and it failed to "inquire into the 'wilfulness' of 
[defendant's] alleged violation." Aplt. Br. at 7-9. 
A. Defendant waived any right to "proper notice" of his probation 
revocation hearing when he declined the trial court's offer to set the 
matter for hearing at a future date and indicated that he preferred to 
have the matter addressed immediately. 
Section 77-18-1(12) of the Utah Code sets forth the procedure which a trial court 
must follow to initiate a probation revocation proceeding. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(12) (1999). Once a trial court determines there is probable cause to believe a violation 
has occurred, the trial court "shall cause to be served on the defendant... an order to 
6 
show cause why his probation should not be revoked." Id. § 77-18-1(12)(b)(ii). 'The 
order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be served 
upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing." Id. § 77-18-1(12)(c)(i). 
Here, defendant claims that the trial court erred in revoking defendant's probation 
at the January 6, 1999 hearing "because appellant was not given proper notice" and 
because "[t]here is no waiver from appellant of time in which to prepare for an order to 
show cause and return to court at another date for the revocation [hearing]." Aplt. Br. at 
6. However, the record discloses that defendant in fact affirmatively waived his right to 
formal notice of the revocation proceeding and his right to additional time to prepare for a 
revocation hearing when he declined the court's offer to set the matter for future hearing 
and asked the court to consider the issue when it was first raised. Thus, any error on the 
trial court's part was invited, and defendant cannot now raise the error on appeal.1 
The "invited error" doctrine provides that "a party cannot take advantage of an 
error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error." 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). Thus, any error that occurs after the 
trial court has given the defendant "ample opportunity" to exercise his rights and the 
defendant's assertion that he "did not receive written notice of the ground upon 
which revocation was sought," Aplt. Br. at 6, is belied by the record. See R. 76:3 
(discussing delivery of copy of progress/violation report and motion for order to show 
cause to defense counsel). Despite his claim otherwise, see Aplt. Br. at 6, both the 
progress/violation report and the order to show cause are included in the record. See 
Sealed Envelope. 
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defendant has "failed to do so," is invited error which will not be addressed on appeal. 
State v. Anderson, 929:P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (finding invited error where "the 
trial court gave defendant ample opportunity to object to jury instruction 27, and he failed 
to do so"); see also State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284-85 (Utah 1989) (refusing to 
reach issue under "invited error" doctrine where defendant was "alleging on appeal 
prejudicial error which was affirmatively, knowingly, and intentionally waived at the 
sentencing proceeding"). 
In this case, the trial court was presented with a progress/violation report at 
defendant's January 6,1999 review hearing (R. 76:3; Report). After reviewing the report, 
the trial court ordered that an order to show cause should issue and that the matter would 
be set for hearing on January 13, 1999 (R. 76:3; Order to Show Cause). Thus, the trial 
court followed the proper procedures under section 77-18-1(12). However, defendant 
then indicated that he wanted to settle the matter at the present hearing (R. 76:3). In 
doing so, defendant waived any right he had to service of formal notice of the revocation 
hearing or additional time to prepare for such hearing. 
Because defendant invited the very error he now claims occurred, this Court 
should refuse to address it. 
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B. The State has no duty to present evidence of a probation violation 
where defendant admits the violation at his revocation hearing. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to require the State to carry its 
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant violated his 
probation. See Aplt. Br. at 7. 
However, defendant cites to no authority requiring the State to affirmatively prove 
a probation violation that defendant himself admits. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) 
(providing that argument section of appellant's brief must "contain the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"); see also State v. Thomas, 961 
P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (holding that "rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to 
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority"); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (holding that brief "must 
contain some support for each contention"). Thus, this Court should decline to reach 
defendant's claim. See Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966 (refusing to address claim on appeal 
where defendant's brief "wholly [lacked] legal analysis and authority to support his 
argument"); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 548-549 (Utah App. 1998) (same); State v. 
Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (same). 
Moreover, defendant here admitted that he had failed to complete the term of his 
probation requiring completion of the Life Skills class while in jail (76:3-4). In addition, 
although he had been warned by the court at the time he was originally sentenced that 
9 
misbehavior in jail could result in the revocation of his probation, defendant admitted that 
he had failed to complete the class because he had been placed in lock-down several 
times for breaking jail rules (R. 76:6). This evidence was sufficient to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that defendant had committed a probation violation. The 
State therefore had no duty to present additional evidence on that issue. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1 (12)(ii) ("If defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations." (emphasis added)). 
C. The transcript of defendant's probation revocation hearing is sufficient 
to conclude that the trial court found, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that defendant wilfully violated the terms of his probation. 
To revoke a defendant's probation, a trial court must find both that a probation 
violation has occurred and, as a general rule, that the violation was willful. See State v. 
Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80, 83 n.5 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 275 
(Utah App. 1990). 
1. Specific findings are not required where the evidence 
supporting revocation is undisputed. 
Section 77-18-1(12)(e)(i), which address probation revocation hearings, requires 
only that the trial court "shall make findings of fact" to support its decision. This Court 
has interpreted that provision as requiring only that the record disclose "the evidence 
relied on and the reasons for revoking probation." See Hodges, 798 P.2d at 274. Cf 
Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207, 210 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that written findings are 
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necessary "only if the transcript and record before the judge do not enable a reviewing 
court to determine the basis of the judge's decision to revoke probation"). 
Here, the evidence presented at defendant's probation revocation hearing was 
provided solely by defendant and was undisputed. Under such circumstances, the record 
adequately discloses both "the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking 
probation." See Hodges, 798 P.2d at 274. Thus, the trial court did not err in failing to 
make specific findings concerning its revocation decision. 
2. The record supports a finding of willfulness where report 
indicated defendant was capable of completing treatment 
program, where defendant was warned to behave in jail 
and where it was his misbehavior that led to an inability 
to complete the Life Skills class. 
Defendant also claims that the trial court failed to "inquire into the 'wilfulness' of 
[defendant's] alleged violation." Aplt. Br. at 6. However, the trial court had no duty to 
inquire into the willfulness of defendant's violation where his willfulness was evident on 
the record. 
a. Defendant waived this claim by failing to raise it below. 
"A general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah is that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate court will review such claim 
on appeal." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1988). "One of the primary 
reasons for [this rule] is to assure that the trial court has the first opportunity to address a 
11 
claim that it erred." State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1992). Thus, "[t]he 
objection must be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error of which 
counsel complains." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Otherwise, "that issue is not properly preserved for 
appeal." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 n.12 (Utah 1993)); Utah R. Crim. P. 20. 
Here, defendant never asked the trial court to consider whether defendant's 
probation violation was willful. Thus, he has waived that claim for purposes of appeal. 
See State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1990) (holding that failure to raise claim at 
probation revocation hearing constitutes waiver). 
b. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that 
defendant's conduct was willful. 
In any case, the record clearly supports a finding that defendant's violation was 
willful. As stated above, to revoke a defendant's probation, a trial court must find both 
that a probation violation has occurred and, as a general rule, that the violation was 
willful. See State v.'Archuleta, 812 P.2d 80, 83 n.5 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Hodges, 
798 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1990). However, "[a] finding of wilfulness merely 
requires a finding that the probation did not make bone fide efforts to meet the conditions 
of his probation." State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 22,124, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 
(quoting State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Archuleta, 812 
P.2d at 84)), cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). In the context of a probation 
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violation, "'willful' . . . does not mean 'intentional.'" Id. (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
At defendant's original sentencing, the trial court addressed defendant's 
troublesome behavior at the prison while he was undergoing a pre-sentence psychiatric 
evaluation (R. 66:12-13). Specifically, the trial court placed defendant on probation but 
warned him that "if you do anything silly at this jail, I'll change my mind and [the review 
hearing in] December won't be a good time" (R. 66:21). Thus, defendant was put on 
specific notice that failing to behave in jail could result in the revocation of his probation. 
Cf. Hodges, 798 P.2d at 277 (suggesting that failure to follow rules after being told that 
probation depended upon it was evidence of willfulness); see also State v. Ruesga, 851 
P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah App. 1993) (holding that failure to sign probation agreement after 
trial court warned that defendant either signed or went to jail, could serve as basis for 
revocation). 
Defendant nonetheless misbehaved while in jail at least seven times, and, as a 
result, did not complete the Life Skills class that was a term of his probation 
(Progress/Violation Report at 1). This evidence—to which defendant offered no 
rebuttal—is sufficient to establish both that defendant had violated his probation and that 
the violation was wilful. See Jameson, 800 P.2d at 804 (holding that evidence that 
defendant failed to cooperate with therapists at treatment center where completion of 
program was term of probation was sufficient to support revocation where only evidence 
13 
presented by defendant "was his testimony that he made a good faith attempt to complete 
his program and only refused to participate in certain aspects of his therapy"). 
The willfulness of defendant's misbehavior is further supported by defense 
counsel's statements at defendant's original sentencing. There, counsel acknowledged: "I 
understand he messed up [by misbehaving] while he was there [for the psychiatric 
evaluation]. He certainly should not have breached any of the rules down there" 
(R. 66:12-13 (emphasis added)). 
Finally, because defendant failed to present any evidence to support a contention 
that his violation was not done willfully, his case is distinguishable from Hodges, the case 
upon which he relies. In Hodges, as here, defendant failed to complete a treats nt 
program that was included as a term of his probation. However, in Hodges, although 
there was "some evidence to support a finding that appellant willfully violated the 
conditions of his probation, [the record] also strongly suggested] that appellant's 
probation was revoked because of problems not within his control." Hodges, 298 P.2d at 
275. Here, there was no evidence that defendant's probation violation was caused by 
"problems not within his control." Thus, the record supports the trial court's finding that 
defendant's violation was willful. 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, the State respectfully asks this Court to affirm the trial 
court's probation revocation order. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED Jl_ September 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on JJ_ September 2000,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, two accurate copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE to Kenneth L. Combs, 
Sherri Palmer & Associates, 285 West Tabernacle, Suite 306, St. George, Utah 84770, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
_ — _ , ^ _ ^ — _ 
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Addendum A 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termina-
tion, revocation, modification, or extension — 
Hearings — Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction,. 
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution 
of sentence and place the defendant on probation The court may place the 
defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation "under the jurisdiction of the • * 
court, 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision « 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has 
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence inves-
tigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These 
standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency IIIII^+III mrm 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what 
level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an 
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures 
to implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection CD (a) 
and other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required 
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors 
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the department or information from 
other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact 
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victims 
family The victim impact statement shall: 
(i) identify the victim of the offense; 
(ii) include a specific statement of the recommended amount of 
complete restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompa-
nied by a recommendation from the department regarding the pay-
ment of court-ordered restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4) 
by the defendant; 
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of 
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence; 
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial 
relationships as a result of the offense; 
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the 
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the 
offense upon the victim or the victim's family that is relevant to the 
trial court's sentencing determination. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific state-
ment of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the 
defendant in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4). 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, 
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of 
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the 
department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report 
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, 
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to 
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation 
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing 
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve 
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten 
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a 
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence inves-
tigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
to be waived 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, 
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant: 
(a) may be required to perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense 
Costs; 
fiii) provide for the support of others for whose supp*/'1 hu '- '« .j,,,!!,, 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use 
of electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, in-
cluding the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-
20.7; 
(v iii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment 
serv ices; 
(be) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with 
interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4); and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers 
appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997, shall be required to: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school gradu-
ation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the 
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the 
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being 
placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items 
listed in Subsection (8XbXi) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department, upon order of the court, shal collect and disburse fines, 
restitution with interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4), and any 
other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance 
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accor-
dance with Subsection 77-18-1(10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the proba-
tion period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed 
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench 
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines, 
restitution, including interest, if any, in accordance with Subsection 
76-3-201(4), and other amounts outstanding. 
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own 
motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his 
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the 
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed. 
(b) The department shall notify the sentencing court and prosecuting 
attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised 
probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a probation 
progress report and complete report of details on outstanding fines, 
restitution, and other amounts outstanding. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing 
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit 
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior 
to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause other-
wise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in accor-
dance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is considered a debt for willful and mali-
cious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to • discharge in bankruptcy as 
provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985. 
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a 
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the 
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from tre- t 
the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2Xg) are receiving pri-
ority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (14). 
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act, Notwithstanding Sections 
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the 
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the 
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the 
presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by 
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of 
the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or 
the subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided 
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime 
on the victim or the victim's household. 
(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of 
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in 
Sections 76-a-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred 
to the department in accordance with Subsection (17). 
(17) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it 
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order 
of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the 
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all 
times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement 
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this 
section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probati ci II " J ii cl M • th c si .p er < » ision • :: f the 
Department of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring devi^ 
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to 
be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in 
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
